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Abstract
During the last decade significant scientific efforts have been invested in
the development of methods that could provide efficient and effective botnet
detection.As a result, an array of detection methods based on diverse technical
principles and targeting various aspects of botnet phenomena have been
defined. As botnets rely on the Internet for both communicating with the
attacker as well as for implementing different attack campaigns, network
traffic analysis is one of the main means of identifying their existence. In
addition to relying on traffic analysis for botnet detection, many contemporary
approaches use machine learning techniques for identifying malicious traffic.
This paper presents a survey of contemporary botnet detection methods
that rely on machine learning for identifying botnet network traffic. The
paper provides a comprehensive overview on the existing scientific work
thus contributing to the better understanding of capabilities, limitations and
opportunities of using machine learning for identifying botnet traffic. Further-
more, the paper outlines possibilities for the future development of machine
learning-based botnet detection systems.
Keywords: Botnet detection, State of the art, Comparative analysis, Traffic
analysis, Machine learning.
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1 Introduction
Botnets represent networks of computers compromised with sophisticated bot
malware that puts them under the control of a remote attacker [1]. Bot malware
provides the attacker with the ability to remotely control behavior of the
compromised computers through specially deployed Command and Control
(C&C) communication channels. Computers compromised by the bot malware
are popularly referred to as bots or zombies, while the attacker is referred to as
the botmaster. Controlled and coordinated by the botmaster, botnets represent
a collaborative and highly distributed platform for the implementation of a
wide range of malicious and illegal activities, such as sending SMAP e-mails,
DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks, Information theft, etc. Due
to their malicious potential botnets are often regarded as one of the biggest
security threats today [1, 2].
Over the course of the last decade, many botnet detection approaches have
been reported in the literature, with various goals, based on diverse technical
principles and varying assumptions about bot behavior and the characteristics
of botnet network activity [2–4]. As botnets rely on the Internet for both
communicating with the attacker as well as for implementing different attack
campaigns network traffic analysis is one of the main means of identifying
existence of botnets. One of the latest trends in network-based botnet detection
is the use of machine learning algorithms (MLAs) for identifying patterns of
malicious traffic. The main assumption of machine learning-based methods is
that botnets create distinguishable patterns within the network traffic and that
these patterns could be efficiently detected using MLAs. This class of detection
approaches promises automated detection that is able to generalize knowledge
about malicious network traffic from the available observations, thus avoiding
pitfalls of signature-based detection approaches that are only able to detect
known traffic anomalies. Various detection methods have been developed
using an array of MLAs deployed in diverse setups [5–24]. These methods
employ diverse principles of traffic analysis targeting various characteristics
of botnet network activity. Furthermore, contemporary detection methods
have been evaluated using different evaluation methodologies and data sets.
The great number of diverse detection solutions introduces the need for a
comprehensive approach to summarizing and comparing existing scientific
efforts, with a goal of understanding the challenges of this class of detection
methods and pinpointing opportunities for the future work.
A number of authors have tried to summarize the field of botnet pro-
tection through series of survey papers [1, 2, 25, 26]. Although providing
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a thorough overview of the field, they only briefly address contemporary
detection approaches. In parallel, several authors, such as Feily et al. [25],
Bailey et al. [26], Garcia et al. [3], Hyslip et al. [27] and Karim et al. [4]
have summarized scientific efforts on botnet detection by proposing novel
taxonomies of detection methods and presenting some of the most prominent
methods. The authors have acknowledged the potential of machine learning-
based approaches in providing efficient and effective detection. Garcia et al.
[3] and Karim et al. [4] have provided some of the most comprehensive
surveys on existing network-based botnet detection approaches indicating the
crucial place of approaches that use MLAs for identifying botnet network
activity. Garcia et al. [3] have compared 14 contemporary anomaly-based
detection approaches from which 8 were based on MLAs, while Karim et al.
[4] analyzed only 3 approaches based on MLAs in more details. Masud et al.
[28] and Dua et al. [29] have analyzed the general role of machine learning
within modern cyber-security. The authors have outlined the benefits of using
machine learning for discovering the existence of the malware on both network
and client levels. However, the authors have not provided an overview of the
state of the art on botnet detection, leaving the question of current trends
within the field of botnet detection unanswered. Finally, several authors have
addressed the challenges of using MLAs for network-based detection [30, 31].
Sommer et al. [30] have pointed out some of the challenges and pitfalls of
using MLAs for intrusion detection. Although relevant to the realm of botnet
detection, claims regarding the usefulness of MLA should be re-evaluated
for the botnet detection context. Aviv et al. [31] have presented some of the
challenges in experimenting with botnet detection methods that are highly
relevant to the use of MLAs for botnet detection.
To the best of our knowledge this paper is the first to provide a compre-
hensive overview of contemporary detection methods that rely on MLAs for
identifying botnet network traffic. The paper has the goal of contributing to
a better understanding of capabilities, limitations and opportunities of using
machine learning for identifying botnet traffic. The contribution of the paper is
three-fold. First, the paper provides a detailed insight on the field by summa-
rizing current scientific efforts. The paper analyzes 20 contemporary detection
methods by investigating the principles of traffic analysis used by the detection
approaches and how different machine learning techniques are adapted in order
to recognize botnet-related traffic patterns. Second, the paper compares the
detection methods by outlining their capabilities, limitations and detection
performance. Special attention is placed on the practice of experimenting
with existing detection approaches and the methodologies of performance
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evaluation. Third, the paper indicates challenges and limitations of the use of
machine learning for identifying botnet traffic and outlines possibilities for
future development of machine learning-based botnet detection systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
background on botnet detection. The section places special emphasis on
botnet detection based on traffic analysis and the use of machine learning for
identifying botnet-related traffic. Section 3 presents the analysis principles
used in order to evaluate existing detection methods. Section 4 presents
the comparative analysis of the state of the art on botnet detection based
on machine learning. This section present the most prominent detection
approaches by analyzing their characteristics, capabilities and limitations.
The discussion of the presented scientific efforts and possibilities for future
improvements is presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Botnet Detection
This section presents the background on botnet detection with the focus on
network-based detection. Furthermore, this section presents the principles of
using MLAs for identifying botnet network traffic.
Depending of the point of deployment detection approaches can gener-
ally be classified as client-based or network-based. Client-based detection
approaches are deployed at the client computer targeting bot malware operat-
ing at the compromised machine [28, 32–37]. These methods commonly detect
the presence of bot malware by examining different client level forensics,
such as: API calls, file changes, application and system logs, active processes,
key-logs, usage of the resources, etc. In addition, some client-based detection
methods also include the analysis of traffic visible on the computer’s network
interfaces [22–24]. Network-based detection, on the other hand, provides
botnet detection by analyzing network traffic at different points in the network.
This class of methods identifies botnets by identifying network traffic produced
in different botnet operational phases such as C&C communication, attack
phase and propagation [2].
There are several conceptual differences between client- and network-
based detection because of which network-based detection is often seen as a
more promising solution. Network-based detection is targeting the essential
aspects of botnet functioning, i.e. network traffic produced as the result of bot-
net operation. Network-based approaches assume that in order to implement
its malicious functions botnets have to exhibit certain network activity. Botnets
could make their operation more stealthy by limiting the intensity of attack
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campaigns (sending SPAM, launching DDoS attacks, scanning for vulnera-
bilities, etc.) and by tainting and obfuscating C&C communication. However,
this often contradicts the goal of providing the most prompt, powerful and
efficient implementation of malicious campaigns. On the other side, attackers
invest great efforts in making the presence of bot malware undetectable at
compromised machines through a number of client level resilience techniques
such as rootkit ability and code obfuscation [38–40]. The attackers also try
to deploy a number of network based resilience techniques such as Fast-flux,
Domain-flux and encryption but these techniques often introduce additional
botnet traits that can be used for detection [17, 41]. Furthermore, as network-
based detection is primarily based on passive analysis of network traffic it
is more stealthy in its operation and even undetectable to botnet operators
in comparison to the client-based detection which could be detected by the
malware operating at the compromised machine. Finally, depending of the
point of traffic monitoring network-based detection can have a wider scope
then the client-level detection systems. When deployed in core and ISP
networks network-based detection approaches are able to capture traffic from
a larger number of client machines. This provides the ability of capturing
additional aspects of botnet phenomena, for instance, group behavior of bots
within the same botnet [8, 42], time regularities of bots activity and diurnal
propagation characteristics of botnets [43].
2.1 Network-Based Detection
Network-based detection is based on the analysis of network traffic in order
to identify presence of compromised computers. Network-based detection is
commonly classified based on the principles of functioning as signature- or
anomaly-based methods. Furthermore, methods can be classified as passive
or active depending on the stealthiness of their operation.
The passive detection approaches operate based on observation only thus
they do not interfere with botnet operation which makes them stealthy in their
operation and undetectable to the attacker. Active detection methods represent
more invasive methods that actively disturb botnet operation by interfering
with malicious activities or the C&C communication of the bots. Additionally,
these techniques often target specific heuristics of the C&C communication
or attack campaigns, arguably providing higher accuracy of detection. The
majority of contemporary botnet detection approaches are passive while only
a few such as BotProbe [44] are active.
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Signature-based methods are based on recognizing botnet specific charac-
teristics of traffic, also known as “signatures” [45–48]. The signature-based
methods rely on a set of predefined rules regarding anomalous traffic and
packet level signatures. These approaches commonly performs packet level
analysis by using deep packet inspection (DPI) in order to match signatures of
malicious payloads. This class of detection techniques covers all three phases
of botnet life-cycle and it is able to detect known botnets with bounded number
of false positives (FP). The main drawback of signature-based approaches is
that they are only able to detect known threats, and that efficient use of these
approaches requires constant update of botnet traffic signatures. Additionally,
these techniques are liable of various evasion techniques that change signa-
tures of botnet traffic and malicious activities of bots, such as encryption and
obfuscation of C&C channel, Fast-flux and DGA techniques, etc.
Anomaly-based detection is a class of detection methods that is devoted to
the detection of traffic anomalies associated with botnet operation [5–24, 42,
49–53]. The traffic anomalies that could be used for detection vary from easily
detectable as changes in traffic rate and latency, to more finite anomalies in
flow patterns. Some of the most prominent anomaly-based approaches detect
anomalies in packet payloads [45, 49], DNS traffic [17, 51, 52], botnet group
behaviour [8, 42, 43], etc. The anomaly-based detection can be realized using
different algorithms ranging from the statistical approaches, machine learning
techniques, graph analysis, etc. In contrast to the signature-based detection,
the anomaly-based detection is generally able to detect new forms of malicious
activity that exhibits anomalous botnet related characteristics. However, one
of the main challenges of using anomaly-based detection is the fact that in
contrast to signature-based detection these approaches result in false positives.
One of the latest and the most promising sub-class of anomaly-based methods
are detection methods that rely on machine learning for detection of bot-related
traffic patterns. The machine learning is used because it offers the possibility
of automated recognition of bot-related traffic patterns. Additionally, machine
learning provides the ability of recognizing the patterns of malicious traffic
without a prior knowledge about the malicious traffic characteristics, but by
inferring knowledge from the available botnet traffic traces.
2.2 Machine Learning for Botnet Detection
The basic assumption behind machine learning-based methods is that botnets
produce distinguishable patterns of network activity and that these patterns
could be detected by employing some of the MLAs [28, 29].
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Machine Learning (ML), is a branch of artificial intelligence, that has the
goal of construction and studying of systems that can learn from data [54].
Learning in this context implies ability to recognize complex patterns and
make qualified decisions based on previously seen data. The main challenge of
machine learning is how to provide generalization of knowledge derived from
the limited set of previous experiences, in order to produce a useful decision
for new, previously unseen, events. To tackle this problem the field of Machine
Learning develops an array of algorithms that discover knowledge from
specific data and experience, based on sound statistical and computational
principles. Machine learning algorithms can be coarsely classified based on
the desired outcome of the algorithm as supervised MLAs and unsupervised
MLAs.
Supervised learning [55] is the class of well-defined machine learning
algorithms that generate a function (i.e., model) that maps inputs to desired
outputs. These algorithms are trained by examples of inputs and their corre-
sponding outputs, and then they are used to predict output for some future
inputs. The supervised MLAs are used for classifying input data into some
defined class and for regression that predict continuous valued output. In
the context of botnet detection, supervised MLAs are commonly used for
implementing network traffic classifiers that are able to classify malicious
from non-malicious traffic or identify traffic belonging to different botnets.
Some of the most popular supervised MLAused for botnet detection are: SVM
(Support Vector Machines), ANN (Artificial Neural Networks), Decision tree
classifiers and Bayesian classifier.
Unsupervised learning [56] is the class of machine learning algorithms
where training data consists of a set of inputs without any corresponding
target output values. The goal of unsupervised learning may be to discover
groups of similar examples within the input data, referred to as clustering, to
determine the distribution of data within the input space, known as density
estimation, or to project the data from a high-dimensional space down to two
or three dimensions for the purpose of visualization. In the context of botnet
detection, un-supervised MLAs are commonly used for the clustering of bot-
related observations. The main characteristic of unsupervised MLAs is that
they do not need to be trained beforehand. The most popular unsupervised
learning approaches used for botnet detection are: K-means, X-means and
Hierarchical clustering.
In both learning scenarios traffic is analyzed from a certain analysis
perspective that entails how do traffic instances, that will be classified or
clustered by MLAs, look like. For each of traffic instances a set of features
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is extracted and used within the MLAs to represent them. Choosing the
right features representation is one of the most challenging task of practical
deployment of MLAs. The chosen features should capture targeted botnet
traffic characteristics and pose balanced requirements in terms of feature
extraction and selection.
In parallel with the two learning problems outlined here modern machine
learning-based approaches commonly implement detection through several
phases, using the combination of different MLAs or by deploying MLAs in an
adaptive manner. This way more fine grained, flexible, and adaptable detection
can be achieved. More details on contemporary detection approaches based
on machine learning can be found in Section 4.
3 Principles of the Analysis
This section presents the principles of analyzing contemporary botnet detec-
tion approaches that rely on MLAs for identifying botnet network activity.
The main goal of the analysis is to provide a review of characteristics and
performance of the existing detection methods in order to assess if they can
provide accurate, real-time detection that is robust to evasion techniques. The
analysis is done by analyzing the characteristics of detection methods, their
performance and evasion techniques methods are vulnerable to. The details
on the principle of the analysis are presented in the following.
3.1 Characteristics of Detection Methods
The characteristics of detection methods are investigated in order to get
the understanding of capabilities and limitations of contemporary detection
methods. The analysis of the characteristics is realized by analyzing the
following:
• Point of traffic monitoring – Point of traffic monitoring infers different
capabilities of detection methods. Existing detection approaches mon-
itor traffic at compromised clients, local networks, campus/enterprise
networks and in core and ISP networks. The main difference between the
points at which methods are implemented is the visible network scope.
For instance, a detection system implemented in the core network has
the potential of having more comprehensive outlook on the behavior of
bots within a certain botnet, than the detection system implemented at a
gateway connecting a local network to the Internet. By the same token, the
client-based techniques are only able to capture network traffic produced
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by individual bots. In this analysis we outline points of traffic monitoring
assumed by the detection methods.
• Detection target – Detection methods commonly detect botnets by
identifying bots or C&C infrastructure. However, in this study we also
address methods that do not directly detect botnets but provide detec-
tion of different network traffic anomalies that commonly characterize
botnet operation such as Fast-flux and Domain-flux. These methods
are DNS-based detection methods that commonly discover malicious
domain names. The findings from DNS-based methods could be used for
discovering C&C infrastructure, as well as for discovering potentially
compromised clients that try to resolve malicious domain names. In
the analysis we outline detection targets of the contemporary detection
approaches. Furthermore, we identify all possible detection targets for
the DNS-based detection approaches.
• Botnet type – Botnets are often coarsely classified based on the emp-
loyed C&C communication protocol as IRC, HTTP and P2P botnets.
Detection methods can cover specific types of botnets or be able to
detect botnets independently from the used C&C protocol. Detection
approaches that target specific types of botnets are often more efficient
than more generic methods. However, these detection techniques are
at the same time less flexible to the changes in the communication
technology used by botnets. In this analysis we outline the type of botnets
targeted by the detection methods.
• Operational phase – Detection methods can target different botnet
operational phases i.e., the propagation phase, the C&C communication
phase or the attack phase [3]. Detection approaches that cover the
C&C communication phase can be directed at various communication
protocols (IRC, HTTP, P2P), while detection approaches that cover the
attack phase can target different attack campaigns (SPAM, DDoS, etc.).
Similarly as for the previous characteristic, detection methods that target
a specific operational phase can be more efficient than the ones that
target more operational phases.Again, these detection techniques are less
flexible to the changing nature of the botnet phenomenon. In this analysis
we outline operational phases targeted by the detection methods.
• Communication protocol – Detection methods analyze traffic at differ-
ent communication protocols in order to achieve detection. The targeted
communication protocols to a large degree depend on the type of bot-
nets and operational phases targeted by the detection approach. Most
commonly, detection approaches analyze traffic at transport layer by
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targeting TCP and UDP traffic and at application layer targeting HTTP,
IRC and DNS traffic. In this analysis we outline communication protocols
analyzed by the detection methods.
• MLAs – The contemporary detection methods rely on different MLAs
employed in diverse setups in order to perform detection of malicious net-
work traffic. Both supervised and unsupervised MLAs are used offering
different levels of automation and resulting in different types of findings.
Furthermore, traffic is analyzed by the MLAs from different perspectives
depending on the targeted communication protocols. Finally, in order to
capture anomalous characteristics of botnet traffic detection approaches
rely on a diverse sets of traffic features extracted for each traffic instance
analyzed by the MLAs. In this analysis we outline MLAs and traffic
analysis perspective used by the detection methods. Furthermore, we
briefly elaborate on the employed feature representation.
• Real-time operation – Timely detection is the preferred characteristic of
detection systems defined as the ability of operating efficiently and pro-
ducing the detection results in a “reasonable” time. The timely detection
entails a need for a detection method to operate in real-time fashion, thus
being capable of processing large quantities of data efficiently. However,
it should be noted that the requirements of realtime operation vary
depending on the used traffic analysis principles and the goal of detection.
In this analysis we outline methods that are advertised as providing real-
time detection and detection approaches that have potential of being used
in real-time based on their operational efficiency.
3.2 Performance Evaluation
Performance evaluation is realized by analyzing evaluation practices used for
experimenting with detection methods, quantitative and qualitative aspects of
evaluation data and obtained detection performance.
One of the main prerequisites of reliable performance evaluation is the
quality of traffic data sets used for training and testing of the proposed detection
approaches [3, 31]. The evaluation data sets should include a substantial
amount of traffic for which the “ground truth” is known i.e. traffic consisting
of elements labeled as malicious and non-malicious. Correctly labeled data
sets are one of the main requirements of deterministic evaluation of detection
performance. The malicious traffic represent traffic produced by botnets, while
non-malicious traffic, often refereed to as the “background” traffic originates
from benign applications running on “clean” computers. The labeled data set
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is formed either by labeling previously recorded traffic trace or by combining
malicious and non malicious data sets. Typical scenarios of obtaining labeled
data sets are outlined bellow:
• Scenario 1 – Labeled traffic is obtained by performing labeling of a
network trace using a variety of different labeling practices. The labeling
of the traffic can be done by using some of the existing IDS systems
[46, 47, 57] and signature-based botnet detection systems [45, 48] or by
relying on domain name and IP address blacklists.
• Scenario 2 – Labeled traffic is obtained by merging a non-malicious
traffic trace with a malicious traffic trace captured by Honeypots [58]
deployed by researchers themselves or by some third party.
• Scenario 3 – Labeled traffic is obtained by merging a non-malicious
traffic trace with a malicious traffic trace generated within fully con-
trollable testing environments, where researchers have total control on
both C&C servers and compromised computers. This scenario requires
bot malware source code to be available. Having the source code,
experiments can be realized in safe and totally controlled fashion.
• Scenario 4 – Labeled traffic is obtained by merging a non-malicious
traffic trace with a malicious traffic trace generated in semi-controlled
testing environments, by purposely infecting computers with a specific
bot malware. Compromised computers are allowed to contact the C&C
servers in order for bot-related traffic to be recorded. In order to limit any
unwanted damage to the third parties on the Internet the traffic produced
by infected machines is filtered using different rate and connection
limiting techniques as well as matching of the malicious signatures of
bot traffic [58].
Non-malicious traffic traces could be obtained in various ways: from self
generated traffic using statistical traffic generators to the network traces
recorded on LAN, campus/enterprise and in some cases even core and ISP
networks. However, it should be noted that for the process of obtaining
background traffic the primary concern is to make sure that the traffic traces
are benign and “representable” for the particular point of traffic monitoring.
While easily achieved on the controlled LAN networks, making sure that
traffic obtained from other real-world networks is benign is a much more
challenging task. Furthermore, as traffic from one network to another vary,
background traffic should match the malicious trace in terms of the point of
traffic monitoring and the type of network.
12 M. Stevanovic and J. M. Pedersen
Besides the way evaluation data sets are obtained, the number of distinct
bot malware samples used for the evaluation of botnet detection methods is
also very important for assessing the generality of the obtained detection per-
formance. Evaluating the detection method using traffic traces from different
types of botnets could indicate the ability of the method to cope with new
threats. Furthermore, using traffic traces form different botnets for training
and testing could give a good indication if a method can generalize well
or not.
Understanding performance metrics used for characterizing contemporary
detection methods is crucial for assessing the capabilities of approaches. Some
of the most frequently used performance metrics are the following:
True positives rate i.e. recall: TPR = recall =
TP
TP + FN
True negative rate: TNR =
TN
TN + FP
False positive rate: FPR =
FP
FP + TN
False negative rate: FNR =
FN
FN + TP
Accuracy: accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FP + TN + FN
Error rate: error =
FP + FN
TP + FP + TN + FN
Precision: precision =
TP
TP + FP
True positive (TP) is the number of positive samples classified as positive, true
negative (TN ) is the number of negative samples classified as negative, false
positive (FP) is the number of negative samples classified as positive, and
false negative (FN ) is the number of positive samples classified as negative.
However, it should be noted that the performance of detection approaches
are commonly expressed using only a subset of the presented performance
metrics, most commonly TPR and FPR.
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3.3 Evasion Tactics
Detection methods should be robust on evasion techniques in such a way that
for detection to be evaded botnets should severely limit the efficiency of imple-
menting their malicious agenda. The vulnerability of detection approaches to
evasion techniques highly depend on the principles of traffic analysis and the
characteristics of botnet traffic targeted by the detection method. Targeting
easily changeable botnet characteristics can lead to evasion, which would
consequently limit the effectiveness of the detection approach. Following
Stinson et al. [59] framework for systematic evaluation of the robustness of
botnet detection methods we evaluate the contemporary detection methods
against following evasion tactics (ET):
• ET1 – Evasion of client based detection. Evasion tactic that evades botnet
detection at the client machine. This category includes a wide range of
techniques, such as evasion by attacking process monitor and evasion by
tainting bot malware behavior at the client computer.
• ET2 – Evasion by traffic encryption. Tactic that performs encryption of
the traffic used within the C&C channel.
• ET3 – Time-based evasion. Evasion techniques that try to avoid bot activ-
ity in specific time windows in which detection methods operate, thus
restricting the detection methods from catching the right observations.
• ET4 – Evasion by flow perturbation. This class of evasion techniques
changes the patterns of traffic by changing the flow statistics.
• ET5 – Evasion by performing only a subset of available attacks, thus
limiting the available observation for the methods that are targeting the
attack phase of botnet operational life-cycle.
• ET6 – Evasion by restricting the number of attack targets, by targeting
clients at the same internal network, thus evading the methods that
monitor traffic at network boundaries.
• ET7 – Evasion of cross-host clustering by employing sophisticated
schemes avoiding the group activities of bots within the same admin-
istrative domain.
• ET8 – Evasion by out-of-band coordination of bots, by using Fast-flux
and DGA algorithms as a mean of communicating, thus providing a level
of privacy and resilience to malicious C&C servers.
The majority of the existing detection methods could be evaded by deploying
some of the presented evasion techniques. However, evasion techniques are
characterized with implementation costs and performance loss that vary from
low to very high [59], thus often causing severe damage to the utility of botnets.
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Therefore, the fact that detection system could be evaded does not necessarily
mean that the cost of evasion will be justified.
4 State of the Art:The Analysis Outlook
This section analyzes contemporary machine learning-based botnet detection
approaches, on the basis of the principles presented in Section 3. The section
evaluates 20 contemporary detection methods [5–24]. The majority of the
evaluated methods are purely network-based [5–21] while the study also
covers several client-level detection approaches that strongly rely on network
traffic analysis [22–24].
4.1 Capabilities and Limitations
The characteristics of the analyzed detection approaches are summarized by
Table 1 and Table 2, where Table 1 provides an overview of the characteristics
of detection methods, while Table 2 summarizes the principles of traffic
analysis and MLAs used by the approaches.
Depending on the point of traffic monitoring the majority of detection
approaches addressed by this survey monitor traffic at local [9, 10, 12, 21]
and possibly campus/enterprise networks [5–8, 11, 20], while others can
be implemented in core and ISP networks [8, 13–19]. Finally, some of the
client-based techniques that strongly rely on network traffic analysis are also
addressed in this survey [22–24].
The detection methods typically contribute to the identification of bots
[5–12, 19–21, 23, 24] or malicious C&C servers [13, 18, 22]. DNS-based
detection methods [14–17] provide identification of malicious domains that
can contribute to the detection of both bots and C&C servers. Based on the
identified malicious domains it is possible to identify both bots that try to
resolve them as well as the C&C infrastructure behind them.
The majority of the analyzed detection approaches target C&C communi-
cation as the main characteristics of botnet operation, while some also include
the ability to capture botnet attack campaigns as well [7, 10, 22–24]. The
propagation phases is covered by only one detection method [7], most likely
as the propagation could be effectively tackled by existing IDS/IPS systems.
Roughly a half of the analyzed detection methods are independent of
C&C communication [7, 8, 13–18, 23, 24], while other methods target
specific types of botnets, such as IRC-based [5, 6, 12, 22], HTTP-based [21]
and P2P-based [9–11, 19, 20] botnets by relying on specific traits of IRC,
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HTTP and P2P C&C channels, respectively. It should be noted that we assume
that DNS-based detection methods [14–17] can contribute to the detection of
botnets independent of the used C&C communication technology.
The methods analyze different communication protocols in order to per-
form botnet detection. Based on the analysis TCP, UDP and DNS protocols are
the most widely targeted which is reasonable as these traffic protocols cover
the majority on botnet network activity. The majority of detection approaches
relies on the analysis of TCP and UDP traffic while some more specifically
cover IRC [5, 6] and HTTP [21] protocols as they are targeting IRC and
HTTP botnets. One approach analyzes all three protocols in order to capture
the majority of the botnet network activities [23].
The real-time operation is promised by only a handful of approaches [8, 13,
14, 18]. Some of the contemporary detection approaches show the potential
of providing real-time detection as they operate in a time window and they
could be periodically re-trained using the new training set or by periodically
updating the clusters of the observation [6, 7, 10–12, 15–17, 20]. Finally, some
methods such as [14] have proved their ability of real-time operation through
a real-world operational deployment.
As illustrated by Table 2, the existing techniques use a variety of machine
learning algorithms deployed in diverse setups. In total 15 different MLAs
were considered by the analyzed approaches. Supervised and unsupervised
MLAs are evenly represented in the analyzed methods. Some of the authors
experimented with more than one MLA providing the good insight on how
the assumed heuristics hold in different learning scenarios as well as what are
the performance of different MLAs [5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 22]. Additionally,
some authors used MLAs in more advanced setups, where clustering of
observation is realized through two level clustering schemes [7, 11, 20] or
where the findings of independent MLAs were correlated in order to pinpoint
the malicious traffic pattern [7, 15, 23, 24]. Several authors used the same
MLAs within their detection systems [5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 22] indicating
some of the well performing clustering and classification algorithms, such as
Decision Tree based classifiers and X-means clustering.
The existing methods use several perspectives of traffic analysis. The
approaches that analyze TCP and UDP traffic generally analyze it from the
perspective of traffic “flows”. It should be noted that definition of a flow
varies from the approach to the approach so some use NetFlow flows [13,
18, 24] while others use a conventional definition of traffic flows where
a flow is defined as traffic on a certain 5-tuple i.e. <ipsrc, portsrc, ipdst,
portdst, protocol>. Furthermore, some approaches consider bi-directional
18 M. Stevanovic and J. M. Pedersen
flows in order to capture the differences in incoming and outgoing traffic [10].
DNS-based detection approaches commonly analyze DNS traffic from the
perspective of DNS query responses (i.e. domain names and their resolving
IPs) [8, 14–16, 19], while some analyze it from the perspective of domain
clusters [17].
Traffic instances are represented as sets of traffic features in MLAs. As
already indicated, feature selection is a challenging task as the feature set
should capture targeted characteristics of malicious traffic. The analyzed
detection approaches greatly vary in employed feature representation. The
TCP/UDP based approaches addressed by the survey use features that are are
generally independent from the payload content, relying on the information
that can be gathered from packets headers as well as different traffic statistics.
Several techniques [7, 12, 21, 22] rely on the content of payloads thus
being easily defeated by the encryption or the obfuscation of the packet
payload. Furthermore, some approaches rely on IP addresses as features
[9, 10] opening the possibility of introducing bias in the evaluation of the
detection performance. In the case of DNS analysis approaches typically rely
on information extracted from the DNS query responses, such as: lexical
domain name features, IP-based features, geo-location features, etc.
4.2 Detection Performance
The analysis of the performance of the methods is illustrated in Table 3, by
providing a brief overview of evaluation practice and data sets used within the
approaches as well as reported performance for analyzed detection methods.
However, it should noted that the results presented in the table represent
the bottom range of reported detection performance and that some of the
approaches are able to provide better results for specific botnet samples, traffic
trace, etc. Additionally, the methods should not be directly compared based
on the reported performance alone, as they used different evaluation practices
and testing data sets. However, the presented performance can still indicate
the overall capabilities of the particular approach in identifying botnet traffic
or bots.
Due to the challenges of obtaining training and testing data, the evaluation
of the proposed botnet detection systems is one of the most challenging
tasks within the development of detection methods [31]. As illustrated
in Table 3 the labeled data sets used for development and evaluation
of the approaches were obtained through all four scenarios, presented in
Section 3. The background data is obtained at the point in the network
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corresponding to the monitoring point the methods are developed for,
most commonly on campus or LAN networks. A number of approaches
obtained evaluation data sets by relying on Scenario 1 [8, 11, 13–17,
19–21]. The majority of these approaches perform DNS traffic analysis
so they used domain/IP blacklists and whitelists of popular domains [8,
14–17, 19, 21] for performing labeling while others rely on commercial IDS
for doing the labeling [11, 13, 20]. The rest of the approaches relied on other
three scenarios of obtaining the evaluation data, where Scenario 2 was used by
only 4 approaches, indicating that the researcher needed to run either malware
code (Scenario 3) or malware binaries (Scenario 4) in order to obtain malicious
network traces.
Furthermore, the malicious traffic samples are usually recorded for a
limited number of bot samples. For instance, the performance of only five
detection approaches were evaluated on the traffic traces produced by more
than 5 bot samples [7, 18, 21, 23, 24], while the maximal number of samples
used for evaluation was 188 in case of [18]. The rest of the methods were tested
with less than 4 bot malware samples. Finally, the diversity of the used malware
samples is poor as the majority of the analyzed approaches rely on less than 3
distinct families of botnets. It should be noted that for DNS-based approaches
the number of botnet families that contributed to DNS traffic contained in
evaluation data sets is commonly unknown.
The performance reported by the analyzed detection methods indicate a
great perspective in identifying botnet traffic and bots using MLAs. Several
detection methods indicate TPR of 100% and overall low FPR [11, 19, 20].
Furthermore, a number of approaches is characterized with a FPR less than
1%. These results indicate the possibility of using some of the approaches in
real-world operational networks.
4.3 Vulnerability to Evasion Techniques
Table 4 illustrates how different approaches cope against evasion techniques
presented in Section 3, by indicating the strength of the indication (SF – strong
factor and WF – weak factor) of methods being evaded by them. However, it
should be noted that the indications given by Table 4 should be used more as
guidelines than as precise measures.
As illustrated in Table 4, the proposed approaches are more or less
vulnerable on different evasion techniques. Generally, the majority of the
analyzed methods are resistant to evasion by encryption of botnet traffic.
Only four approaches [7, 12, 21, 22] that rely on features extracted from
packet payload are vulnerable on this evasion strategy. However, the majority
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Table 4 An overview of evasion tactics for detection methods
Evasion Tactics
Detection Method ET1 ET2 ET3 ET4 ET5 ET6 ET7 ET8
Livadas et al. [5] – – SF SF – – – –
Strayer et al. [6] – – SF SF – – SF –
Gu et al. [7] – WF WF SF SF WF SF –
Choi et al. [8] – – WF – – – SF SF
Saad et al. [9] – – SF SF – – – SF
Zhao et al. [10] – – SF SF SF WF – SF
Zhang et al. [11] – – SF SF – WF – SF
Lu et al. [12] – SF SF SF – – – SF
Bilge et al. [13] – – SF SF – – SF SF
Bilge et al. [14] – – SF – – – SF –
Antonakakis et al. [15] – – WF – – – SF –
Antonakakis et al. [16] – – WF – – – SF –
Perdisci et al. [17] – – SF – – – SF –
Tegeler et al. [18] – – SF SF – WF SF WF
Zhao et al. [19] – – SF – – – SF WF
Zhang et al. [20] – – SF SF – – – SF
Haddadi et al. [21] – SF SF SF – – – SF
Masud et al. [22] SF SF SF SF – – – –
Shin et al. [23] SF – SF SF WF – – WF
Zeng et al. [24] SF – SF SF – WF SF –
Comment: SF – strong factor, WF – weak factor
of the techniques are vulnerable on evasion by flow perturbation, due to the
fact that they analyze traffic on the flow level. Furthermore, all the techniques
are more or less vulnerable on time-based evasion, especially the ones that
promise the real-time operation. Finally, the analyzed client-based [22–24]
techniques are vulnerable on evasion techniques that target the monitoring of
the internals of a host computer.
This study does not address the complexities of evasion techniques and
their effect on the overall utility of the botnet. The future work could be
directed at more thorough analysis of evasion techniques and vulnerability of
modern detection systems to them, covering effect of evasion techniques to
both detection systems and overall utility of the botnet.
5 Discussion
In this section we elaborate on the findings of the analysis presented in the
previous section outlining several challenges of using MLAs for identifying
botnet network activity.
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5.1 Principles of Traffic Analysis
As shown in Section 3 detection methods target botnets from different
monitoring points where the majority of the approaches are implemented at
local and campus/enterprise networks. This can be explained due to several
reasons. First, MLAs are data-driven and they depend on available evaluation
data sets that are mostly formed by capturing botnet network activity at local
networks. Second, the analysis of traffic in core and ISP networks assumes the
ability of processing a substantial amount of traffic which can be a challenge
for some of the approaches. However, it should be noted that depending on the
monitoring point different portions of a botnet can be seen and consequently
different malicious traffic characteristics can be targeted. Therefore, detection
methods can often be seen as complementary solutions to the botnet detection
problem rather than competing solutions.
The analyzed detection methods can either target all botnets types or a
specific type based on their C&C communication technology. Furthermore,
the approaches could capture different botnet operational phases. The idea of
targeting specific type of botnets is to achieve better detection performances
which has proved to be true by a number of studies [11, 20]. However, these
more specific detection approaches should be used in combination with other
detection approaches in order to provide effective and hard to evade detection.
The analyzed detection approaches most commonly target TCP, UDP
and DNS protocols using different traffic detection perspectives. We would
like to stress the importance of the analysis perspective as choosing the
analysis perspective is important to the practical use of machine-learning based
approaches. The used analysis perspective should encompass the nature of the
targeted phenomena and should carry the context that would be understandable
to the operator of the system.Asuitable example would be DNS traffic analysis,
where DNS traffic could be analyzed from the perspective of either domain
names or more complex domains-to-IPs mappings. The former implies that
for each domain name a number of features is extracted and MLAs is used
to identify if domain is malicious or not. The latter extracts domains-to-IPs
mappings i.e. mappings between queried domain names and resolving IP
addresses and determines if the mappings are malicious or not. The difference
between the two scenarios is significant. Analyzing DNS from the perspective
of domain names would segment traffic into much larger sets of instances than
in the case of domains-to-IPs mappings. Furthermore, in the first case the result
of detection would bring only limited information to the operator, i.e. only
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detection result. Analyzing DNS traffic from the perspectives of domains-to-
IPs mappings would, on the other hand, yield more descriptive detection results
as the identified mappings bring more information to the system operator
then the simple classification of domain names. Furthermore, domains-to-IPs
perspective encompasses the characteristics of IP- and Domain-flux strategies
that are often used by the cyber criminals.
As presented in Table 2 different MLAs have been used as a tool for
identifying botnets. Some of the most popular MLAs are decision tree clas-
sifiers (C4.5, Random Forests, REPTree) for classification and Hierarchical
clustering and X-means clustering for grouping traffic observations. This does
not come as surprise as these algorithms have showed their capabilities in
network traffic analysis and classification of Internet traffic over the last decade
[60]. Furthermore, as indicated in the previous section detection approaches
use diverse traffic features for representing traffic instances within their
detection algorithms. However, using features that would introduce bias in the
detection such as IPaddresses should be avoided.Also the use of features based
on packet payloads should be avoided due to possible evasion by encryption
and the violation of the privacy of end-users.
5.2 Evaluation Challenge
The main challenge in evaluating the analyzed detection methods is obtaining
reliable evaluation data sets that would successfully capture a substantial
amount of both malicious and non-malicious traffic instances. As illustrated
in the previous section, existing studies have used different strategies for
obtaining the ground truth on botnet network activity, using all scenarios out-
lined in the Section 3. However, each of the scenarios comes with drawbacks
that should be thoroughly understood. The main drawback of Scenario 1 is
inherited from the imperfections of data set labeling techniques. Labeling
by relying on domain and IP blacklists and signature-based IDSs has its
drawbacks that could lead to unreliable ground truth [61–64]. Although many
authors [65] have tried to solve this problem proposing different strategies of
eliminating false positives in the process of labeling, the problem remains
largely unsolved. The scenarios that rely on merging the malicious and
non-malicious traffic traces suffer from the pitfall of artificially merging
diverse traces. The technique of merging should not introduce additional
traffic anomalies that would lead to a biased detection. Furthermore, the non-
malicious background traffic used for forming the evaluation data sets should
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be obtained at the point of traffic monitoring corresponding to the monitoring
point at which the botnet trace was recorded.
Based on the analysis the majority of the detection approaches were
evaluated using traffic from a modest number of botnets. This could be
explained due to many legal, ethical and practical limitations of obtaining the
botnet traffic traces. However, the small number of used bot samples indicates
the need for more thorough testing where more comprehensive set of malware
samples would be used, in order to prove that the detection system is able to
generalize inferred botnet knowledge to previously unseen botnets.
5.3 Cost of Errors
The evaluated botnet detection methods report overall promising perfor-
mances of identifying malicious traffic. However, the majority of the
approaches are characterized with a substantial number of FP and FN. We
would like to elaborate on the cost of these errors by following Sommer
et al. [30] analysis of the cost of errors on intrusion detection use case. As in
the case of any other anomaly detection system botnet detection systems are
sensitive to number of FP. The high number of FP positives can easily deem
the detection method unusable from the perspective of the use in operational
networks. Furthermore, depending on the use case botnet detection can have a
high cost of FN as any compromised machine within the operational network
could cause a lot of technical and financial damage. Therefore, an optimal
detection approach would have FP close to zero and minimized number of FN.
However, based on the analysis presented in Section 4 only a few detection
methods could potentially fulfill this requirement opening the space for further
improvements.
5.4 Opportunities for Future Work
Future work should be devoted to the development of detection methods that
would find their use within operational networks. These methods should rely
on the principles of network traffic analysis that would encompass targeted
botnet network characteristics and would carry the context that is understand-
able to the operator of the system. Furthermore, one of the important goals
of future detection systems is to operate in real-time thus facilitating timely
detection. The future methods should be evaluated using an extensive set of
network traces originating from different types of botnets. Finally, special
attention should be placed on minimizing the number of errors in identifying
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botnet network traffic so the proposed methods would performance-wise be
suitable for being used in operational networks.
6 Conclusion
The use of machine learning algorithms (MLAs) for identifying botnet network
traffic has been the subject of interest within the research community during
the last decade resulting in numerous detection methods. The contemporary
detection methods are based on different principles of traffic analysis, they
target diverse traits of botnet network activity using a variety of machine
learning algorithms and they consequently provide varying performance of
detection. This paper outlines the opportunities and challenges of using MLAs
for identifying botnet network activity and presents the review of the most
prominent contemporary botnet detection methods based on MLAs. The
presented study covers 20 detection methods, proposed over the last decade.
The methods have been analyzed by investigating principles of their operation,
the used evaluation procedures, obtained performance and vulnerabilities on
evasion techniques. The analysis indicates a great potential of this class of
approaches to be used for identifying botnet network traffic. However, the
study also indicates some of the challenges of using MLAs in the context of
network-based botnet detection that should be thoroughly understood in order
for this class of detection methods to be effectively used.
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